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Does a leader’s psychology affect his/her likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate 
dispute? The study of leadership psychology has continuously found support for the central 
assumption that leaders matter in explaining a state’s foreign policy behavior. However, many of 
these research projects have relied on small-sample case studies and experimental methods that 
have limited generalizability. In this paper, I use two variables drawn from the research program 
on leadership trait analysis (distrust and need for power) in a multivariate large-n study to 
explain the initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). 1,601 cases are drawn from the 
Correlates of War MID data set. First, using an ANOVA model, I demonstrate that MID 
initiators have higher average scores for both distrust and need for power and that this difference 
is statistically significant. Then, using logistic regression, I demonstrate that distrust and need for 
power have statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood of MID initiation. I 
conclude by comparing the predicted probabilities of the psychological variables of interest with 
territorial contiguity. All of these methods demonstrate that the psychological traits of leaders 
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The substantive question this paper seeks to ask is: does a leader’s need for power and 
level of distrust affect his/her willingness to initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID)? The 
conflict studies literature is rich with research about MIDs, and that research has identified 
several structural explanations for the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes. However, this 
preponderance of structural explanations for MID onset or initiation leaves out a fundamental 
variable: the heads of state in the international system. The field of political psychology has 
provided some insights about how leadership personality traits affect foreign policy behavior. 
Unfortunately, a majority of the psychological models of foreign policy and international 
relations have involved analyzing a small number of historical cases (Levy 2013, 302). In this 
paper, I apply variables from leadership trait analysis to a large-N study of militarized interstate 
dispute initiation. 
In this larger-N study, I find that both distrust and need for power have strong, 
statistically significant, and positive effects on the likelihood a state will Initiate a MID. Further, 
I demonstrate that one variable in particular, distrust, performs better than territorial contiguity at 
explaining an increased probability of MID initiation. This research shows that psychological 
variables, when tested in a large-N setting, can perform as well or better than the more easily 
tested structural variables at explaining the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute.  
 To follow will be a review of the existing literature discussing the initiation of militarized 
interstate disputes, and what political psychology has to say about the initiation of conflict more 
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broadly. Following the literature review will be a clearly spelled out theoretical justification for 




LITERATURE REVIEW  
A militarized interstate dispute is defined as: “a set of interactions between or among 
states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military 
force. To be included these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government 
sanctioned” (Gochman and Moaz 1984, 587). As stated in the introduction, the conflict studies 
literature has contributed several structural explanations for the occurrence of international 
conflict. The following review of the literature will discuss research focused on the occurrence of 
international conflict. 
Power Parity and International Conflict  
 One of the earliest bodies of literature considering causes of international conflict focused 
on the importance of dyadic balance of power. Garnham (1976) clearly lays out the three 
fundamental assumptions of the power parity hypothesis and seeks to test them empirically. The 
three central assumptions are: 1) governments are rational and will only use force if the 
perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs 2) governments will only use force if they 
cannot achieve their goals through diplomacy 3) governments calculate costs and benefits based 
on comparisons of their nation’s power with that of their potential target (Garnham 1976, 380). 
As expected, Garnham found that geographically contiguous states with roughly equal power 
would have a higher probability of engaging in lethal violence (1976, 390). 
 An essential component of the understanding of power’s effect on aggressive foreign 
policy behavior stems from the research of power transition theory. Power transition theory 
assumes that hegemons face challenges from growing major powers who have become 
dissatisfied with the system status quo (Sobek and Wells 2013, 69). Research in this area of 
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international relations has found support for the theory in various ways over 40 years (DiCicco 
and Levy 1999, 675-676). Rather than emphasizing the presence of parity between states, power 
transition theory focuses on power shifts. Spiezio (1999) demonstrates there is a relationship 
between “critical point intervals” and a great power’s propensity for involvement in a militarized 
dispute. Until recently, the research focused on the interactions of major power states. Sobek and 
Wells made the logical connection that if power transition theory is true for great powers, the 
logic would apply to other dyads (2013, 69).  
This research vein, though robust, is an incomplete picture of the causes of interstate 
conflict. Like many structural explanations of international interactions, excluding the 
individuals inside the organizations leaves it open to criticism. The central assumption of 
research like this implies that each head of state – who is the principal decision maker in the 
realm of foreign policy – would perceive changes in the dyadic balance of power in the same 
way.   
Alliances and International Conflict  
 Jack levy produced one of the most notable empirical studies exploring the relationship 
between alliance formation and great power conflict over a large span of time (1981). The 
findings of this research indicate that, after the Congress of Vienna, the nature of alliances 
changed to alliances that were more likely to create a more peaceful international system (Levy 
1981). However, the research itself has a number of shortcomings that called for further 
investigation. First, like many pieces of research in the study of conflict, the focus rests on the 
presence of conflict in the system rather than its initiation. Therefore, it is challenging to make a 
statement about the potential deterrent effect of alliance formation or vice versa (Bennett and 
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Stam 2000b). Further, the research focuses only on the occurrence of great power wars and 
conflicts across a broad time span, which greatly limits the generalizability of the findings.  
 Leeds (2003) took some of the fundamental assumptions of alliance and conflict research 
and applied them to the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Leeds notes that simply 
asking the question, “do alliances lead to peace or war?” is insufficient (2006, 427). Unlike Levy 
(1981), Leeds distinguishes between the different types of alliances when constructing her model 
(2003). Leeds finds that the type of alliance (defensive, offensive, or neutrality agreement) 
affects the probability of initiation differently (2003). If the potential target has a defensive ally, 
the likelihood of initiating a MID decreases; and if the potential initiator has an offensive ally or 
a neutrality agreement the likelihood of that state initiating a MID increases (Leeds 2003, 435). 
However, it is not simply the focus on differing alliance types that gives this research more 
explanatory value. Leeds also uses the directed-dyad year as the unit of analysis and therefore 
provides better information about the effect of alliances on conflict initiation rather than merely 
its presence in the international system.  
 An additional piece of research considered the potential effect of alliance formation on 
conflict initiation somewhat differently. First, the central premise of the article is that the 
processes that result in the formation of interstate alliances cannot be divorced from the 
processes that result in the initiation of conflict (Kimball 2006, 371). The author finds that the 
regime type of member dyads is a more significant predictor of alliance formation and conflict 
behavior respectively (Kimball 2006, 386). This research diverges from a majority of alliance 
research by arguing that alliances by themselves do not have a direct effect on the willingness to 
engage in interstate conflict, rather that alliances have an indirect effect. 
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 Like most research into structural causes of MID initiation, the alliance research agenda 
fails to consider how leaders may vary in their perceptions of the importance of alliances. Some 
leaders may be more risk acceptant than others and there may well be an interaction between the 
presence or absence of allies and a leader’s level of risk acceptance. This interaction could cause 
the significance of alliances to disappear in some cases.  
Democratic Peace  
 The democratic peace theory has largely been considered by many scholars to be the 
closest thing to a law of nature in international relations. The democratic peace has two central 
empirical claims: 1) democracies are unlikely to fight one another; 2) democracies are just as 
conflict prone as non-democracies (Rousseau et al. 1996, 512). Though the democratic peace 
literature has said a great deal about the presence or absence of dyadic international conflict, 
there is a surprising absence of attempts to explain which states actually initiate conflict. The 
following section will consider some of the democratic peace literature that addresses the factors 
affecting initiation of militarized interstate dispute. 
 Reiter and Stam (2003) begin addressing a recurring problem in the democratic peace 
literature by changing the dependent variable of focus from onset (the presence or absence of 
conflict in a dyad) to initiation (one side taking a directed action against another). Their findings 
support earlier research (see Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002) that democracy-
personalistic dictatorship dyads are more conflict prone than other democracy-dictatorship 
dyads. However, they are also able to identify the direction of the dyadic conflict relationship, 
and show that dictatorships (regardless of type) are more likely to initiate disputes with 
democracies (Reiter and Stam 2003, 336). 
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Before Reiter and Stam’s (2003) study of factors affecting the propensity to initiate 
conflict, Ireland and Gartner (2001) considered causes of conflict initiation within certain 
democratic regimes. Using hazard analysis to measure the duration between the formation of a 
governing coalition and the initiation of the first MID, Ireland and Gartner find that majority and 
coalition governments in a parliamentary system are more likely to initiate MIDs sooner than 
minority governments in similar systems (2001, 558-561). Their findings also provide support 
for some alliance hypotheses by showing that having allies decreases the probability of conflict 
initiation (Ireland and Gartner 2001, 559).  More broadly, these findings provide support for the 
hypothesis that democracies fight less because of perceived political vulnerability. Majority and 
coalition governments are far less vulnerable than minority governments and are willing to take 
the risk of initiating MIDs (Ireland and Gartner 2001, 561).  
 Building upon that research Reiter and Tillman attempt to uncover how democracies 
make foreign policy decisions differently than other states in the international system (2002, 811-
812). The authors find that differing aspects within democracy have an effect on the propensity 
to initiate MIDs. They find that greater political participation and an independent legislature have 
strong negative effects on the willingness to initiate disputes (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 821). 
However, being a major power and having autocratic states on the border increases the 
likelihood of initiating MIDs (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 821).  
 In 2006, Lai and Slater considered institutional variation between autocracies in an effort 
to explain conflict behavior. Using the monadic state-year as the unit of analysis, Lai and Slater 
find that in a model where democracies are excluded, only military dictatorships were more 
likely to initiate conflict than party-based authoritarian regimes (2006, 121). In addition, there is 
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no statistically significant difference between party-based authoritarian regimes and democracies 
and their likelihood to initiate MIDs (Lai and Slater 2006, 121). All the previous research 
focused not simply on the factors affecting conflict initiation between autocracies and 
democracies, but also on the factors within these different styles of government that made them 
more or less conflict prone. 
The Liberal Peace  
Moving away from a focus on regime type, Oneal and colleagues (1996) consider the 
importance of economic interdependence for the onset of MIDs. The authors find that the power 
of the democratic peace theory is greatly magnified by the presence or absence of economic 
interdependence at the dyadic level (Oneal et al. 1993, 23-24). These findings are replicated in a 
later study with adjustments to the measurement of joint democracy (Oneal and Ray 1997). 
However, Barbieri (1996) finds that trade interdependence does not significantly decrease the 
propensity for conflict. Rather, the impact of trade on dyadic conflict onset is curvilinear. If a 
dyad is too interdependent or the relationship is too asymmetrical, the propensity for conflict 
increases in a statistically significant way (Barbieri, 1996, pp. 42-44). This finding is challenged 
by a subsequent study that finds no evidence that asymmetric trade increases the likelihood of 
MID onset for politically relevant dyads (Oneal & Russett, 1999).  
Souva and Prins consider the effect of economic interdependence on the willingness of a 
state to initiate violent MIDs in particular (2006). Using a monadic model, the authors find that 
economic interdependence has a statistically significant negative effect on the initiation of 
violent MIDs. However, the magnitude is not as large as regime type and typical variables for 
conflict initiation such as national-capabilities (Souva and Prins 2006, 194). The findings in this 
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research should be taken with a grain of salt. To determine which state initiated, the authors rely 
on the classification of a state as having revisionist intentions as opposed to being classified as 
the Side A state, which is coded as the first militarized movers by the MID data set (Souva and 
Prins 2006, 190). However, only 55.6% of states on Side A are coded as revisionist states 
(Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138). Coding revisionist states as initiators leaves out a large 
percentage of potential cases. Using a similar research design, Boehmer found support for the 
argument that democracies are less likely than other states to initiate MIDs (2008). The author 
differed coding Side A states as the initiator rather than the coding revisionist states as initiators 
(Boehmer 2008, 88-91). 
 A more recent study has considered the pacifying effect of trade by considering the effect 
of exit costs. Peterson (2014) argues that trade is only pacifying when the cost of terminating that 
trade, often associated with the onset of dyadic conflict, is roughly equal between states in a 
dyad. Rather than assuming that bilateral trade is almost always pacifying, Peterson demonstrates 
empirically that conflict is more likely when only one of the two states has more to lose by 
terminating the trade relationship (2014, 584-585). However, it is worth noting that Peterson 
does not consider MID initiation as many other authors do, rather considers the raw number of 
conflict events as the dependent variable (Peterson 2014, 569-570). 
The Economic Peace 
 A more recent area of research argues that democracy matters less than the type of 
economic system within a state in question. This research area argues that the norms that arise in 
developed market economies are the cause of pacific relations previously attributed to the 
degrees of democracy. One of the earliest articles published in this area considered the 
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possibility that the democratic peace was limited only to well developed economies with strong 
contract norms and enforcement (Mousseau 2000). In this article, Mousseau makes a convincing 
argument for the connection between contract/economic norms, the emergence of democracy and 
democratic values, and the underlying reason the democratic peace exists (2000, 475-482). 
Building on this idea, Mousseau demonstrates that not only are economically developed 
democracies less likely to engage in conflict with one another, they are more likely to collaborate 
in militarized conflicts (2002).  
 As the research area evolved, researchers began discounting the democratic peace as it 
became clearer that the contract norms within a country may do a better job at explaining the 
presence or absence of conflict between states. Mousseau demonstrates that contract-intensive 
economies – states with strong contract enforcement – engaged in no fatal MIDs between 1961-
2001, while democracies without these contract norms are not as pacific (2009, 53). Unlike many 
of the other structural explanations for the presence or absence of conflict, economic norms 
theorists began including explicit, albeit untested, assumptions about the role psychology may 
play in conflict. Mousseau argued that contract-poor (clientelist) economies, because of their 
reliance on interpersonal connections for economic activity (tribe/clan/religion), create 
individuals with higher levels of distrust and in-group bias that contractualist (contract-intensive) 
economies (2013, 187-188). Nevertheless, economic norms theory has provided an interesting 
perspective into understanding the emergence of international conflict. Despite its contributions, 




Political Psychology and Dispute Initiation  
Political psychology has contributed a variety of interesting theories and findings to the 
understanding of international conflict. However, as stated above, much of the research has 
relied on small-sample case studies or difficult-to-generalize experiments to explain the agent 
aspect of foreign policy behavior (Levy 2013, 302). This section will review the literature 
contributed by political psychology to the understanding of international conflict by moving the 
focus from the state as the unit of analysis, to the individual leaders who make foreign policy 
decisions.  
 Operational code analysis has been a prominent tool to assess leadership belief systems in 
the post-World War II era. Operational code analysis has evolved to focus on a political belief 
system in which elements (philosophical beliefs) guide a leader’s understanding of the context 
for action and other elements (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the strategy and tactics for 
achieving political goals (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 216). Operational code analysis has 
been used to explain variation in American foreign policy behavior in response to international 
strategic adjustment (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999). This method has also been used to 
explore various aspects of the democratic peace hypothesis. Schafer and Walker explore the 
monadic-level and dyadic-level hypotheses associated with the democratic peace (2006). In 
addition, they address the assumption that the behavior of democratic states is informed by the 
norms of governance within that state (Schafer and Walker 2006). Interestingly, they were able 
to demonstrate findings similar to other liberal theorists comparing the operational codes of Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair. They demonstrated found little support for the monadic assumption – 
democracies are generally more peaceful – and for the assumption that the different norms of 
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governing affected their beliefs, while finding that both were more peaceful toward democracies 
than other states in general (Schafer and Walker 2006, 575-576).  
Earlier, Hermann and Kegley (1995) also brought the idea of leadership psychology more 
directly into the research about the democratic peace. Without trying to dispute the central 
premises of the democratic peace theory, Hermann and Kegley sought to answer the question of 
“why democracies behave the way they do,” by incorporating theories from political psychology 
(1995, 511-512). In the same year, Kegley and Hermann moved forward with empirical testing 
of their theory, considering the case of the Reagan Administration’s covert military interventions 
in the 1980s, and demonstrate that the primary factor used by Reagan involved aspects of his 
psychology first and his government institutional constraints second (1995, 23) (For a critique of 
their findings, see Tures 2001).  
 Building upon the above research, Keller (2005) explores the interaction between regime 
type and leadership style. In an attempt to address the conflicting views of the monadic aspects 
of the democratic peace (democracies are generally more pacific), Keller considers whether 
leaders’ willingness to respect or challenge constraints explains differences in democratic 
responses to foreign policy crises (2005). Keller finds that leaders willing to respect constraints 
in a democratic system are significantly more likely to use non-violent means when dealing with 
foreign policy crises than democratic leaders who are not constraint respecters (2005, 225-226). 
Interestingly, findings also indicate that leaders in democracies who are more willing to 
challenge constraints are likely to place an emphasis on violence and use more severe violence 
than their autocratic counterparts that respect constraints (Keller 2005, 225-226).  
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Keller and Foster explored the relationship between what they call a leader’s perception 
of a the locus of control and the number of uses of diversionary force by U.S. Presidents between 
1953 and 2000 (2012). They find that leaders high in self-confidence and high in their belief in 
ability to control events are more likely to use force against state and non-state actors in periods 
of declining popularity (Keller and Foster 2012, 594-595). Most recently, Foster and Keller 
found that leaders with high scores for distrust and low scores for conceptual complexity were 
more likely to use force when faced with domestic opposition or falling popularity (2013). 
Though both of these studies provide valuable insight into the link between leadership traits and 
aggressive foreign policy behavior, both studies focus only on the diversionary use of force by 
the United States (Keller and Foster 2012; Foster and Keller 2013). This greatly hinders the 
generalizability of the findings beyond the hegemonic state or beyond simply the use of force as 
a political tool.  
 Another area of research considers the effect of integrative complexity on the emergence 
of international conflict. Integrative complexity refers to the way in which a leader processes 
information. A leader scoring low in integrative complexity is characterized by simple responses, 
large distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage; while a leader scoring high is 
characterized by complexity, flexibility, and effective information search (Suedfeld and Tetlock 
1977, 169). 
 Other scholars consider the effect of motivations on the outbreak and duration of conflict. 
For instance, David Winter finds that a high need for power and a low need for affiliation often 
precipitate the outbreak of war. Further, Winter finds that wars already underway only end when 
there is a decrease in the need for power and an increase in the need for affiliation (1993). 
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However, like much of the earlier political psychology research, this research focuses on a small 
number of cases (3) of international conflict.   
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 Within much of the international relations literature, there has been an emphasis on 
explaining foreign policy behavior using various structural or situational variables. These works 
have implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, assumed that heads of state make decisions in a 
vacuum (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 76; Levy 2013, 301). However, Jack Levy notes that 
the explanations of many important historical events often give great causal weight to the leader 
in charge (2013, 301). As the literature review above demonstrates, some scholars of 
international relations have to come to accept that who leads matters.   
 Granted, there has been rigorous debate about which psychological factors of leaders 
matter. Some scholars emphasize the importance of political beliefs of individual leaders 
(Schafer and Walker 2006; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999; Walker, Schafer, and Young 
2003). Others consider factors such as group decision-making processes and how they are 
affected by individuals (Schafer and Crichlow 2010). The literature review above demonstrates 
the diversity of research based on the premise that leaders matter in explaining foreign policy 
behavior. There is widespread agreement that people matter in the conduct of foreign policy 
decision-making.  
 For the purpose of this paper, leadership style will be the theoretical area of focus. There 
have been a number of empirical research projects demonstrating the importance of leadership 
style in explaining varying political behavior (see Hermann 2003, 184). Leadership style 
attempts to explain how leaders relate to those around them, how they structure interactions, and 
the norms, rules and principles they use to guide them (Hermann 2003, 181). Rather than 
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focusing on broad categories, such as willingness to respect constraints (i.e. Keller 2005), I focus 
on two variables within leadership trait analysis: distrust and need for power.   
Distrust and Foreign Policy Behavior 
 Distrust is often connected with the leader’s perception of the world he/she is working in. 
Distrustful leaders perceive the world as being more dangerous than leaders who are more 
trusting. Rather than thinking of distrust as the opposite of trust, it may be more beneficial to 
think of distrust as a personality trait that can shift depending on the  situation. A leader may 
become more distrustful overtime if he/she is repeatedly taken advantage of by other heads of 
state.  
Leaders with high levels of distrust tend to have a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness, 
misgiving, and wariness about others (Hermann 2003, 202). Therefore, these individuals are 
likely to suspect the motivations and actions of other, particularly in regards to those they view 
as competitors (Hermann 2003, 202). In the domain of foreign policy, distrust has been shown to 
be one of the most important determinants of a hawkish foreign policy (Foster and Keller 2013 
5). Distrust causes higher threat perceptions and increases a leader’s willingness to use force to 
neutralize those threats (Driver 1977; Holsti 1962 as cited in Foster and Keller 2013, 5).  
However, much of the literature regarding threat perception relies upon an actor’s 
response to a specific action taken by another actor. I assume that leaders who score higher for 
distrust will not only be suspect of those they perceive as competitors; they will also see a greater 
number of competitors in the international arena. Therefore, distrustful leaders will be more 
likely to be more aggressive with a larger number of states than less distrustful leaders. The first 
hypothesis emerges from this assumption:  
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H1: Leaders with higher scores for distrust will be more likely to initiate militarized 
interstate disputes. 
Need for Power and Foreign Policy Behavior  
 The need for power motive can be defined as a concern about having impact, control, or 
influence on another person, group, or world at large (Winter 2003, 155). A high need for power 
may manifest itself as increased visibility and an attraction to careers that give them control over 
a situation (Winter 2003, 158). However, the shadowy side of the power motive may also bring 
serious negative consequence. People with a high power motivation are susceptible to flattery 
and tend to improve only after success rather than failure; in decision-making there is little 
attention paid to moral considerations; these individuals may be extreme risk takers who engage 
in aggressive (verbal or physical) and impulsive behavior (Winter 2003, 158). 
 Leaders with a high need for power have been shown to more independent and 
confrontational in their foreign policy interaction while expressing a more generally negative 
affect toward other states in general (Winter 2003, 163). Motive research has often indicated that 
a high power motivation is a strong explanatory variable for entry into war (Winter 1993, 534). 
Though these findings have been applied primarily to small-sample research, it is assumed that 
the finding will remain significant in a larger-sample study of conflict initiation. Therefore, a 
second hypothesis is constructed:  
H2: Leaders with higher scores for need for power will be more likely to initiate 






 The sample used for this research consists of cases from the Correlates of War Dyadic 
MID Data Set (COWMID). Using the EUGene software, a directed dyad-year data set has been 
constructed. The sample consists of 1,601 cases of MID initiations and no MID initiations 
between the years 1995-2001. The total number of conflict dyads in this sample is 39 and the 
total number of non-conflict dyads is 1,562.1 Because speech texts were not readily available for 
every leader in every possible directed dyad, I was forced to drop some of the initially-selected 
cases based upon availability – or in this case lack thereof – of data. As a result, I have texts for 
68 leaders between 1995-2001, some of whom initiated a MID, and some did not.2 A list of those 
leaders who initiated MIDs and their scores for both psychological variables of interest is 
presented in Appendix A. I discuss my speech text sources more in the section on variables. 
Finally, some cases had to be dropped because of missing data for defensive alliance and polity 
scores.  
The directed dyad-year is the appropriate unit of analysis for a variety of reasons. First, 
the directed dyad-year is the only unit of analysis that can be used to understand initiation rather 
than simply the onset of a militarized interstate dispute. Also, since my primary variables are 
individual-level variables (psychology), a unit of analysis that allows for the incorporation of 
                                                 
1 MID initiations are rare events. Therefore, it is not uncommon to have this ratio of MID initiations to non-
initiations in dyadic data.  
2 Remember, the unit of analysis is the politically relevant directed dyad-year not the individual leader. Therefore, a 
single leader has more than one potential dyadic interaction. That is how I can have 1,601 cases, while only having 
speech texts for 68 leaders.  
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variables at more than one level of analysis is needed and thus the directed dyad-year is more 
appropriate (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 655-656). Though I am focusing on the importance of 
individual-level variables, it would be foolish to assume that leaders operate in a vacuum.  
In addition, for the sample, only politically-relevant dyads are used. Politically relevant 
dyads are considered to be the population of dyads at greatest risk for international conflict 
(Lemke and Reed 2001, 126). Politically-relevant dyads are pairs of states that are either 
geographically contiguous (on land or separated by some amount of water) or contain at least 
one major power (Bennett 2006, 245; Lemke and Reed 2001, 126). For this research, a dyad will 
be considered politically relevant if the states in the dyad share a land border or are separated by 
up to 400 miles of water or less. A thorough study of the various operationalizations of political 
relevance show this minimizes the number of conflict cases potentially left out (Bennett 2006). 
Though conflicts have occurred in non-politically-relevant dyads, research indicates that 
excluding these cases in a sample does not threaten valid inference (Lemke and Reed 2001, 140-
143). The use of politically-relevant dyads permits me to exclude cases that did not have the 
opportunity to fight, which allows me to focus on factors affecting willingness rather than both 
opportunity and willingness (Bennett 2006, 246).  
Next, only the first year of the MID is coded as the initiation year, and subsequent years 
are dropped from the data set. EUGene gives a researcher the ability to drop all dyads that begin 
the year with an ongoing dispute (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 186). Bennett and Stam argue that 
when ongoing conflicts are included, statistical assumptions of case independence break down. 
As a result, though there may be a new MID in subsequent years, any changes to the independent 
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variables during an ongoing conflict are endogenous to the process of initiation (2000a, 661). 
Finally, I will not include reverse (hypothetical target versus initiator) dyads in my data set. 
Variables  
 The dependent variable for this study is the initiation (or not) of a militarized interstate 
dispute. For this paper, the dispute initiator will be determined by the COWMID data set’s 
coding for “Side A” states. Side A states are coded as initiators if they are the first states to 
threaten, display, or use force during an interaction with another state (Gochman and Maoz, 
1984). Some have disagreed with this operationalization of the initiator; some scholars believe 
that the revisionist state (the state seeking a change to the international status quo) should be 
coded as the initiator (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 658; Souva and Prins 2006). However, this 
classification is inappropriate for this research since I am trying to understand things that lead 
heads of state to initiate militarized conflicts, not pursue a change in the status quo. Only 55.6% 
of states coded as revisionist actually militarize disputes (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 
138). Identifying which of those revisionist states is willing to use violence to pursue change in 
the status quo is beyond the scope of this research.    
 The first independent variable is leader distrust. Distrust is an interval-level variable, and 
the score will be determined using Profiler Plus content analysis software 
(www.socialscienceautomation.com). The content to be analyzed will be public speeches, 
interviews, and press conferences gathered from available open sources. Public statements made 
before the initiation of a MID or the start of a non-conflict year will be necessary. The second 
independent variable, need for power, will be scored using Profiler Plus as well. The time frame 
for the verbal material is the year prior to the conflict or non-conflict year.  
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 Need for power is coded by focusing on verbs. The conditions of need for power are 
scored when the speaker proposes or engages in a strong or forceful action such as an assault or 
attack, verbal through, accusation or reprimand; gives advice or assistance when it is not 
solicited; tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else only if the concern is not reach 
agreement; and is concerned with his/her reputation (Herrmann 2003, 190). When coding for 
distrust, Profiler Plus will focus on nouns and noun phrases referring to persons other than the 
leader and the leader’s group. First, a noun or noun phrase is coded as indicating distrust if it 
expresses distrust, doubt, misgivings about, feelings of unease about, feeling of weariness about 
what persons or groups other than the leader’s are doing. Second, if a leader shows concern 
about what these persons or groups are doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong, 
etc. to him or herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause important to them (Hermann 2003, 202-203). I 
provide excerpts of speeches that scored highest and lowest for distrust and need for power in 
Appendix B, C, and D respectively.  
 The speech texts for this research come from a variety of sources. Some were pulled from 
wire services and broadcast transcripts via the database Lexis Nexis. So long as the leader being 
examined is quoted directly – not paraphrased – the transcripts were considered a valid source 
material. For U.S. Presidents, I relied heavily on the American Presidency Project’s database of 
news conferences. For more elusive leaders, I found prepared speeches at some 
intergovernmental organization gatherings, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). I 
also pulled text from parliamentary debates using Hansard or other various governmental 
websites when applicable.  
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I will include several control variables in the design. The first control variable is the 
regime type. It is theoretically argued that democratic regimes will be less likely to initiate 
conflicts than non-democratic states (Reiter and Stam 2003). The ordinal score for side A will be 
pulled from the Polity IV data set. The measure of joint democracy will be taken from the Polity 
IV Data set also and will be presented as a dichotomous variable in accordance with standard 
democratic peace research: a dyad is coded as a jointly democratic if both states have a polity 
score 6 or higher (Souva and Prins 2006, 192). Joint democracy is expected to have a strong 
negative effect on the likelihood of conflict (Oneal, et al. 1993). Like Souva and Prins (2006), I 
expect that foreign direct investment (FDI) dependence will have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of MID initiation. FDI will be determined by dividing the total amount of FDI by a 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP); the data will be gathered from the World Bank. Also, 
like Souva and Prins (2006), I will use the Penn World Table to get access to data about a state’s 
trade openness as a proxy for trade dependence (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). Openness is 
calculated by taking the sum of imports and exports and dividing the sum by the state’s gross 
national product (GNP). Finally, I will include GDP per capita as a measure of economic 
development within the potential initiating state (Souva and Prins 2006, 192). Each of these 
measures has been found to decrease the likelihood of violent MID initiation (Souva and Prins 
2006).  
Since some politically-relevant dyads contain states that are not necessarily contiguous 
(i.e. major power – any state dyad); territorial contiguity will be included as a separate control 
variable. The data for geographic contiguity will be gathered using the EUGene software. The 
measure of contiguity is ordinal. The further away states in a dyad become the higher the 
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number. 1 being the states that share a land border and 6 being states that are separated by up to 
450 miles of water (Bennett and Stam 2000b). Geographic contiguity has been shown to increase 
the likelihood of conflict between two states in the previous research because of an increased 
opportunity (Leeds 2003, 434).   
Another control variable is pulled from Leeds’s (2003) research on the important effect 
of alliances on the likelihood a state will initiate a MID. The control variable of interest in my 
data set is the presence or absence of an ally for the potential target state (side B) that has 
promised to come to their aid if attacked. The variable is binary for each directed dyad-year 
(Leeds 2005). The presence of a defensive ally is expected to have a statistically significant, 
negative effect on the likelihood a side A state will initiate a MID (Leeds 2003).    
A final control I will include is the logarithm of the capability ratio between potential 
initiators and potential targets (Russett and Oneal 2001, 103).  Like Russett and Oneal I expect a 
negative relationship between the capability ratio and the likelihood of MID initiation (2001, 
107-108). This means that as the ratio becomes larger – meaning that the potential challenger 
state has a greater share of the dyadic capabilities relative to the potential target – the likelihood 
of initiating a MID decreases. The data will be taken from the Correlates of War project 
capabilities data set using the EUGene program. The CINC score is based on data on states’ total 
population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military 
expenditures, and the size of armed forces. The score represents each state’s share of the world’s 





 Though the issue of temporal dependence can be common in research using MID data, 
my sample is not vulnerable to this problem because I explicitly drop any ongoing conflict years. 
Leaving those in place would do serious damage to the assumption of independence among cases 
(Bennett and Stam 2000a, 661). Therefore, I will be using a logistic regression model to calculate 
the effect of the independent variable and control variables, on the likelihood of dispute 
initiation. I will use the Relogit specification for carrying out logistic regression with rara events 
data (Tomz, King, and Zeng 1999). I will also utilize sample averages method to determine the 
effect of a particular independent variable, holding all other variables constant at their sample 
means, on the estimated probability of the dependent variable (Pollock 2012, 233-234). Finally, I 
will include an ANOVA analysis to consider the variance in mean distrust scores between 




FINDINGS   
 The most basic models in this paper rely upon demonstrating that there is a statistically 
significant difference between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not. Therefore, I first 
present the results of ANOVA models for both psychological variables. The first model 
considers distrust. Leaders who initiate MIDs have an average distrust score of approximately 
.14, while leaders who do not initiate MIDs have a mean distrust score of .10. The difference 
between the two groups is in the expected direction: leaders who initiate MIDs are on average 
more distrustful than those who do not. The difference between the two mean scores is 
statistically significant, as seen in the ANOVA results, F(1,600, 1) = 19.94, p <  .0001. The 
results are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1. ANOVA Results Distrust 
 Observations Mean  
Non-Initiators 1,562 .098 
Initiators 39 .135 
The same question is posed for the psychological variable need for power. In this case, as 
with distrust, there is a difference in the average need for power scores between initiators and 
non-initiators. Initiators have an average need for power score of .249, while non-initiators 
average .259. The difference is in the expected direction: leaders who initiate MIDs have a 
higher average score for need for power than those who do not. Further, the difference is 




Table 2. ANOVA Results Need for Power 
 Observations Mean  
Non-Initiators 1,562  .249 
Initiators 39  .259 
 
 The significant differences between the two groups is very interesting indeed. What has 
been demonstrated in this section is that individual-level variables, which would be expected to 
vary in less than predictable ways between heads of state, are to some degree predictable. In 
these two models, I have successfully demonstrated that initiators are more distrustful and have a 
greater need for power than leaders who do not initiate MIDs.  
 Before discussing the results of the logistic regression, a discussion of potential 
correlations between the independent variables is needed. The correlations for each of the 
independent variables are presented in Table 3. First, I will discuss the correlations between the 
psychological variables of interest and the control variables. When considering the relationship 
between distrust and need for power, it is apparent that the relationship is statistically significant 
and weakly positive (r = .1256). Though the correlation is weakly positive, it would be 
worthwhile to create models that will explore each psychological variable without the other.  
 The most powerful correlation is between the polity score for the side A state and the 
GDP per capita of the potential challenger state. There is a statistically significant and strong 
positive relationship between the GDP per capita and the ordinal polity score for the potential 
challenger (r = .7404). Granted, this relationship is not surprising given the well documented 
relationship between market prosperity and the emergence of democracy (for review see 
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Mousseau 2000). Nevertheless, I will explore the effect of the correlation in the logistic 
regression models to follow.   
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Table 3 Correlations of Independent Variables 












































































































































































































Note: P-values presented in parentheses under r,  N=1,601
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Now that a difference between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not has been 
established, I turn to the multivariate logistic regression models in Table 4. Model 1 is the full 
multivariate model with all the control variables. The purpose of this model is determine which, 
if any, of the control variables fail to achieve statistical significance and can thus be omitted 
from subsequent models. The control variables behave as expected. First, the ratio of capabilities 
between the two states in the dyad performs as expected. As the potential challenger becomes 
more powerful relative to the potential target, the likelihood of that state initiating a MID 
decreases in a statistically significant way (p < .001). The results perform as expected as well for 
territorial contiguity. The farther apart the two states get, the less likely a state is to initiate a 
MID. Joint democracy lessens the likelihood of MID initiation, and the presence of a defensive 
ally for the target state also decreases the likelihood of MID initiation. However, FDI, trade 
openness, and GDP per capita fail to achieve significance despite the effects being in the 
expected direction.  
 Turning to the psychological variables of interest, model one indicates that distrust 
behaves as expected by hypothesis 1. Distrust has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
likelihood that a leader will initiate a militarized interstate dispute; the higher a leader’s level of 
distrust, the more likely he or she is to initiate a MID. In model 1, however, need for power fails 
to achieve significance at the p < .10 level though the relationship is in the expected direction. In 
the following models I will remove the control variables that fail to achieve significance. This 
will give me the opportunity to consider the effect of my psychological variables and the 
significant controls without the statistical noise of the  insignificant controls.  
 Now, I turn to Model 2. In this model, I remove all control variables that fail to achieve 
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statistical significance, except for need for power, which is not removed from model 2 since it is 
one of the independent variables of interest. The insignificant variables are removed from model 
2, and all subsequent models, because they do not lend anymore insight to the understanding of 
MID initiation. Above, there was discussion of the strong significant relationship between the 
polity score for the potential challenger state and the GDP per capita of the potential challenger 
state. Though the test is not reported in Table 4, removing the polity score and leaving in GDP 
per capita did not have any effect on the significance of GDP per capita (p = .358). Therefore, 
even when taking this significant correlation into account, GDP per capita does not have any 
significant effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. As a result, the models testing this did not 
merit reporting in Table 4.  
 After removing the insignificant variables in model 2, need for power achieves statistical 
significance at the p < .10 level and the relationship is positive as hypothesis 2 predicted. This 
indicates that as a leader’s need for power increases, he/she is more likely to initiate a MID. 
Distrust continues to have a significant positive effect on the likelihood a potential challenger 
will initiate a MID. The power of the potential challenger state relative to the potential target 
state continues to have a significant negative effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. Similarly 
territorial contiguity, joint democracy, and the presence of a defensive ally for the potential target 
state continue to have a statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of MID 
initiation.  
Since distrust and need for power are both psychological characteristics operating at the 
individual level of analysis, it is possible that both are competing for similar sources of the 
variance in the dependent variable, thus reducing the significance of the impact of each.  Support 
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for this assertion comes in part from the statistically significant positive correlation between the 
two variables reported in Table 3.  To test these effects, I ran two more models.  Model 3, keeps 
need for power in the model but removes distrust.  In this model, all the control variables 
maintain their respective directions and statistical significance.  In model 3, need for power does 
indeed reach standard levels of significance (b=7.44, p < .05).  As the need for power of a leader 
increases, there is a statistically-significantly higher likelihood that the state will initiate a MID, 
even when controlling for important and significant structural variables. In model 4, I remove 
need for power and consider just distrust in relation to the other structural control variables. As 
model 4 demonstrates, distrust continues to be statistically significant without the presence of 
need for power when considered alongside the other structural variables. Finally, the effect of 
distrust is stronger without need for power in the model.  
Finally, in Model 5, I test the possibility that distrust’s significance relies on territorial 
contiguity. Therefore, I remove territorial contiguity from model 5 and review the effect. After 
removing territorial contiguity from model 5, need for power loses its significance once again. 
However, distrust does not. Model 5 demonstrates that distrust can stand on its own as an 
explanatory variable without the inclusion of territorial contiguity. However, need for power has 




Table 4. Logistic Regression Models 





















































Polity Side A 
-.017 
(.016) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 



















----- ----- ----- ----- 
GDP Per Cap 
-.0000108 
(.0000293) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
Constant 3.39 -2.65*** -2.67*** -1.75*** -4.09**** 
N 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01 ****p < .001  Note: Standard Error in parentheses below logit coefficients.   
Next, I will evaluate the predicted probabilities for two of my psychological variables and 
compare the performance of those variables to territorial contiguity, one of the most consistently 
important structural variables in conflict studies (Bremer 1992). Further, this control variable is 
highly significant in all of my models with a p-value consistently p < .001. Logistic regression 
allows us to think of the effect of independent variables on dichotomous dependent variables in 
terms of odds ratios and percentage change in the odds of a 1 (MID initiation) instead of a 0 (no 
MID initiation) (Pollock 2012b, 200). However, the method also assumes a nonlinear 
relationship between need for power and distrust and the probability of initiating a MID (Pollock 
2012b, 200). This means that logistic regression assumes that a one unit increase in distrust/need 
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for power will have less of an effect on those with extremely high or extremely low distrust/need 
for power, but that a one unit increase will have a much greater effect on those who have 
moderate scores for need for power and/or distrust. The people who score extremely high on 
these traits are already likely to initiate a MID and those who are extremely low are likely to not 
initiate a MID. However, for those with moderate scores for these psychological traits, a one unit 
increase along one or both of these traits (i.e. going from a distrust score of 0.1 to a distrust of 
0.2) could be the difference between deciding to initiate a MID and deciding not to initiate a 
MID (Pollock 2012, 200). Rather than dealing with odds ratios or percentage change in the odds, 
it is much easier to think about the effect of need for power and distrust on the probability of 
initiating a MID. As a result, I turn to predicted probabilities. The predicted probability graphs 
are a visual representation of the effect of distrust, need for power, and territorial contiguity on 
the probability of MID initiation.3 
Figure 1 shows the predicted probability curve for distrust, the psychological variable 
from hypothesis one. Remember that initiators and non-initiators differ in a statistically 
significant way regarding this variable, and that distrust is a consistently significant explanatory 
variable for MID initiation. The distrust score is along the x-axis and the probability of initiating 
a MID at each value of the independent variable is on the y-axis. The curve indicates visual 
support for hypothesis one: as the value for distrust increases, the probability of MID initiation 
also increases. The probability of initiating a MID at the lowest score for distrust is 
approximately .0025, while the probability of initiating a MID at the highest score for distrust is 
                                                 
3 In response to a comment from a committee member, I explored the possibility that the significance of the 
variables depends upon the regime type of a state. I tested the model looking only at the effects for autocracies and 
democracies separately. The results were insignificant, indicating the polity score for side A worked better as a 
control variable.  
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approximately .07. A change from a score of 0.1 for distrust to 0.2 moves the probability of MID 
initiation from approximately .01 to approximately .02. However, the overall probability remains 
low because this study is dealing with the occurrence of a rare event, thus the baseline 
probability of a MID occurring at all is low regardless of the independent variables of interest.  
 
 Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities – Distrust4 
 The predicted probabilities of need for power are presented in Figure 2. Like distrust, 
need for power behaves as expected. Figure 2 demonstrates that at the lowest score for need for 
power, the probability of initiating a MID is approximately .007. As the predicted probability 
curve moves up to its maximum score for need for power, the probability of MID initiation 
becomes approximately .027. Figure 2 demonstrates that as need for power moves from the 
                                                 


























lowest score of approximately 0.17 to the highest score of approximately .425, the probability of 
a state initiating a MID increases accordingly. This provides additional support for hypothesis 2.  
 
 Figure 2 Predicted Probabilities for - Need for Power5 
In Figure 3, I present the predicted probabilities for one of the strongest structural 
variables in the conflict studies literature, territorial contiguity. Remember, that contiguity has 
time and again had a strong relationship with the likelihood a state will initiate a MID, and that 
the further away states in the dyad are, the less likely it is that a state will initiate a MID (Bremer 
1992). Contiguity is an important control variable in all of my models. Its importance is 
demonstrated by the consistent statistical significance in each of my models. The curve goes in 
the expected direction: as states get further away from each other, the probability that the 
                                                 






























potential challenger state will initiate a MID decreases. As with the psych variables, despite the 
accepted importance of contiguity, the probability remains low because MID initiation is a rare 
event.  
 
Figure 3 Predicted Probabilities – Territorial Contiguity6 
 Now I will move into comparing the three different predicted probability models. It has 
already been demonstrated that the three variables behave as expected. First, I will explore how 
distrust compares with territorial contiguity. The highest level (i.e. maximum score in my data 
set) of distrust increases the probability of MID initiation to approximately .07. Whereas, the 
probability associated with the lowest score for territorial contiguity – meaning the states in the 
                                                 



























dyads are closest to each other and therefore more prone to conflict – is only approximately .048. 
This is a profoundly interesting finding. This comparison indicates that a leader’s score for 
distrust does a better job of explaining the probability of MID initiation than territorial 
contiguity.  
 Finally, consider the way need for power compares with territorial contiguity. The 
maximum score for need for power is associated with a maximum probability of approximately 
.027. As stated above, the score for territorial contiguity associated with higher levels of conflict 
is associated with a maximum probability of approximately .048. Need for power’s effect on the 
probability of MID initiation is not as strong as the effect of territorial contiguity. Nevertheless, 
need for power continues to demonstrate a strong positive effect on the probability of MID 
initiation. The overarching message of this section is that the psychological variables of interest 
in this study perform as well or, in the case of distrust, better than territorial contiguity in terms 
of explaining the increased probability of MID initiation.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper started by asking a straight forward question: do a leader’s psychological traits 
affect his/her state’s likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate dispute? The answer is 
emphatically yes. The first demonstration came with the ANOVA models that considered 
differences between leaders who initiated and those who did not. In agreement with the 
expectations, MID-initiating leaders had higher average scores for need for power and distrust, 
and the difference between the two groups were statistically significant. Given that one would 
expect such traits to vary from person to person in unpredictable ways, the ANOVA tests 
demonstrate that the differences between the two groups of leaders are, in fact, quite predictable.  
 Moving on to the logistic regression models, the assertions made earlier in the paper find 
further statistical support. Knowing the groups of leaders are different along these psychological 
traits, the logistic regression models demonstrate a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the psychological variables and the likelihood a leader will initiate a MID, 
even when controlling for important structural and situational variables. However, it is worth 
noting that need for power is less consistent. In model 1, the model with all control variables 
present, need for power does not achieve significance at the p < .10 level. Once the non-
significant structural control variables were removed in subsequent models, need for power 
achieved significance at the p < .10 level. Only when distrust was removed in model 3 did need 
for power reach significance at the standard p < .05 level. It is also the case that need for power 
did not maintain significance without the presence of territorial contiguity. This raises the 
possibility that need for power is associated with aggressive foreign policy behavior directed at 
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states nearby, something that later studies can investigate more carefully. Nevertheless, need for 
power is a noteworthy explanatory variable for understanding the likelihood of MID initiation.  
 Distrust fares much better throughout the models. Distrust remains significant at the p < 
.001 level regardless of which variables are removed in the various models. The data indicate 
emphatically that a more distrustful leader is far more likely to be the first militarized mover in 
an aggressive dyadic interaction. Of the two psychological variables tested here, distrust is the 
most important explanatory variable for the initiation of militarized interstate disputes.  
Beyond the ANOVA models and the logistic regression models, the psychological 
variables of interest fare very well when I consider the effect they have on probability compared 
with a powerful structural control variable. The results showed strong support for my 
independent variables of interest. Further, it is worth restating that the psychological variables 
performed as well as, and in the case of distrust performed better than, territorial contiguity.  
 Considering the diversity of my sample, I am not reluctant to say my results are 
generalizable. My sample includes leaders from a variety of regions rather than simply relying 
on data from great powers or American presidents (i.e. Foster and Keller 2013). To my 
knowledge, my sample is the only one to gather psychological data from such a broad range of 
states.  
 The confidence in my sample does not mean that my research is without limitations. 
Some scholars who utilize similar content analysis methods may also take issue with the fact that 
I use both prepared speeches and off the cuff press conference statements and other spontaneous 
material. It could be argued that the act of preparing speech creates opportunities for speech 
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writers to contaminate the text with their psychological characteristics or biases. However, it is 
hard to believe that a head of state will use a speech written by someone else that is drastically 
out of line with his/her world view. Additionally, the initial potential sample was limited because 
of the availability – or more accurately lack thereof – of speech texts. So, though I have a 
broader range of states than existing studies, some cases simply had to be dropped in an ad hoc 
fashion.  
 The admitted limitations notwithstanding, the findings I have presented here have made a 
strong a case for the importance of leaders’ psychological traits in explaining the initiation of 
militarized interstate disputes. Distrustful leaders as well as leaders with a high need for power 
are more likely to initiate MIDs than heads of state that score lower on these traits. Given the 
more comprehensive (in terms of states included) and larger sample size than previous research 
in this area, I believe the case made here for the importance of psychological variables is 




DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The interesting findings demonstrated above did leave some questions unanswered. 
Therefore, the closing section of this paper will be dedicated to possible future research. As 
discussed in the theoretical foundations section, distrust is often spoken about in considered as 
response variable. Meaning, that as distrustful leader A observes a troop buildup of leader B, 
leader A is more likely to perceive that action as a threat and respond in kind (the classic security 
dilemma). With this in mind, another future research project may involve making conflict 
escalation the dependent variable of interest. Perhaps a leader high in distrust may be more likely 
to militarize a dispute with a state that simply expresses verbal dissatisfaction with either the 
dyadic or international status quo. A large-n study of this possibility is lacking in the field and is 
something that could almost certainly be carried out.  
 Much of the research mentioned in the literature review lends itself to the inclusion of 
psychological variables. Consider for a moment the balance of power research vein. Perhaps 
power shifts increase the likelihood of conflict because the head of the stronger state was more 
distrustful of the rising other. Perhaps the significance of power shifts depends upon a leader’s 
distrust in the case of the stronger power and/or need for power in the case of the rising power. 
Power shifts do not occur in a vacuum, and heads of state make the final decision about when to 
initiate militarized conflicts. As was often stated in the literature review, simply focusing on 
structure is inadequate for explaining the occurrence of interstate conflict.  
 Need for power has potential explanatory power beyond the understanding of interstate 
conflict. Perhaps making the dependent variable the ‘revisionist state – or the state that wishes to 
change the status quo. It is very possible that need for power would have a very strong 
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relationship with this variable since a change in – for example – the dyadic status quo would 
likely involve elevating the lesser power. Beyond simply the debate over the operationalization 
of MID initiator (side A versus Revisionist state), need for power has implication for the broader 
operation of foreign policy decision-making than has yet been addressed. If need for power is 
truly to be conceptualized as the need to impose one’s will on another person (Hermann 2003, 
154) – in the case of foreign policy analysis the state – then perhaps researchers should look past 
the use of force as the only means of trying to influence other states. Perhaps need for power 
would have a very strong and significant effect on the use of both positive and negative sanctions 
be heads of state.  
 With the emergence and application of automated content-analysis (Profiler Plus), data 
set construction (EUGene), and the public availability of speeches by heads of state via the 
internet, it is hard to conceive of many of these psychological questions going unanswered. 
Applying psychological variables to standard large-n conflict studies models is becoming 
increasingly easier to carry out. This research has helped to create a more complete 
understanding of the effect of variables from different levels of analysis on the likelihood of 




LIST OF MID INITIATORS AND THEIR SCORES  
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Year Country Leader Need for Power Distrust 
1995 Russia Boris Yeltsin .235 .041 
1996 Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev 0.267 0.061 
1996 Russia Boris Yeltsin 0.215 0.155 
1996 China Jiang Zemin 0.175 0.105 
1996 Cuba  Fidel Castro  0.235 0.157 
1996  Egypt  Hosni 
Mubarak 
0.254 0.119 
1996 South Korea  Kim Young-
Sam  
0.267 0 
1996 Philippines  Fidel V. 
Ramos 
0.302 0.183 
1996 Syria Hafez al-
Assad 
0.188 0.207 
1996 UK John Major 0.251 0.046 
1996 USA Bill Clinton 0.283 0.064 
1997 Russia Boris Yeltsin 0.169 0.015 
1997 Canada Jean Chretien 0.192 0.085 
1997 Greece Costas Simitis 0.270 0.075 
1997 Philippines  Fidel V. 
Ramos 
0.283 0.294 
1997 Syria Hafez al-
Assad 
0.199 0.157 
1997 Ukraine Leonid 
Kuchma 
0.232 0.078 
1997 Uzbekistan  Islam Karimov 0.248 0.060 
1997 USA Bill Clinton 0.228 0.094 
1998 Turkey Mesut Yilmaz 0.267 0.065 
1998  USA Bill Clinton 0.258 0.111 
1999 Azerbaijan  Heydar Aliyev  0.236 0.076 
1999 Australia  John Howard 0.228 0.225 
1999 Russia Boris Yeltsin 0.279 0.181 
1999 China  Jiang Zemin  0.272 0.078 
1999 Japan  Keizo Obuchi 0.267 0.123 
1999 Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah 
0.268 0.234 
1999 UK Tony Blair  0.228 0.190 
2000 Germany Gerhard 
Schroder  
0.189 0.167 
2000 Nigeria  Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
0.415 0.394 
2000 Turkey  Bulent Ecevit  0.307 0.107 
2000 UK Tony Blair 0.258 0.059 
2001  Azerbaijan  Heydar Aliyev  0.219 0.087 
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2001 China Jiang Zemin 0.253 0.172 
2001 France Jacques Chirac 0.222 0.055 
2001 Honduras  Carlos Flores  0.240 0.123 
2001 India Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee 
0.25 0.185 
2001 Norway  Jens 
Stoltenberg 
0.293 0.059 
2001 Russia Vladimir Putin  0.232 0.155 
2001 Sierra Leone  Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah  
0.277 0.219 
2001 Turkey Bulent Ecevit  0.409 0.049 
2001 UK Tony Blair  0.271 0.167 
2001 USA  Bill Clinton  0.273 0.08 




EXCERPT OF SPEECH THAT SCORED HIGHEST IN NEED FOR 
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Africans are entitled to celebrate the exit of colonialism from their continent, just in time 
before the psychological deadline of the end of this millennium. At the same time, a look into 
our immediate past, not to seek whom to blame for our current woes, but to critically review our 
realities, will show colonial legacy as an impediment to Africa's progress and development. 
Let us face it, the truth is that almost all modern African nation states were conceived and 
established by colonial design. And until independence, governance of these nation states was 
the complete anti-thesis of democracy, being government of exploitation, by the exploiters, and 
for the exploiters. No matter what apologists for colonialism have to say, all manifestations of 
progress and development experienced by African peoples under colonialism came by default, 
certainly not by the design of those who came to our continent solely for what they could take. 
Hence the popular sentiments of the early nationalists who preferred freedom in poverty to 
affluence in bondage. 
African nationalists who led their nations into independence have confessed to the 
daunting challenges in meeting the expectations of their hard won freedom. Leadership of the 
nation state felt like the captaincy of a ship which, though legitimately belonged to Africans1 had 
been preprogrammed to move in the direction of colonial goals and objectives. To achieve real 
nationhood, these African leaders needed to put the African societies and peoples back into the 
imposed geopolitical shells. They needed to make the governance of African citizens the 
responsibility of Africans themselves. National development needed to have Africans as the 




Mere change of name, as many African countries did, was not enough to subdue the 
inevitable debate over the nature and purpose of the acquired nationhood. Leadership of the 
emergent nations were impelled to find quick solutions to the inherited colonial contradiction of 
development concept de-linked from equitable and democratic governance. Success at managing 
this contradiction varied from country to country, depending on such circumstances as economic 
conditions, geopolitical size, ethnic composition, and the number of educated elites to push their 
differing political visions. But invariably, there was attendant confusion, often chaos and violent 
upheavals that came with the formidable leadership task of re-focusing, re-orientating and 
restructuring the emergent African nation states 
Hardly an African nation escaped a phase of instability as political and intellectual 
leaders quarreled and fought each other over the meaning of independence and the purpose of 
nationhood. And the notion of benevolent dictatorship gained ground as the stable means of 
moving African nations forward. 
Military incursions into African politics in the sixties and seventies were generally 
greeted with degrees of euphoria. The ordinary African felt a sense of security with the uniform, 
so to speak. And political thinkers, in disregard of their liberal philosophical noots in democratic 
theory, hailed the un-elected military rulers of the post-colonial state by ascribing to them several 
virtues. 
Score – Distrust: 0.394 
Score – Need for Power: 0.415 
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Esteemed journalists, ladies and gentlemen, the first meeting of the Presidents of Russia 
and the United States has been held after our reelection. Naturally, it was a difficult one because 
difficult issues were under discussion. But as always, our meeting was quite frank, and on the 
whole, it was successful. And I am completely in accord with what the President of the United 
States, Bill Clinton, just said. 
We have opened a new stage of Russian-American relations. We discussed in detail the 
entire range of Russian-American issues—issues of Russian-American partnership, which is 
quite broad in scale. After all, our countries occupy such a position in the world that the global 
issues are a subject of our discussions. 
Both sides defended their national interests, and both countries did not abandon them. 
However, our two great powers have an area—a vast area—of congruent interests. Chief among 
these is the stability in the international situation. This requires us to develop our relations, and 
there has been progress in that direction. 
Five joint statements have been signed as a result of our meeting—President Bill Clinton 
and I just concluded signing these—on European security, on parameters of future reductions in 
nuclear forces, concerning the ABM missile treaty, on chemical weapons, and we also signed a 
U.S.-Russian economic initiative. But we have not merely stated our positions. We view the 
signed statements with the U.S. President as a program of our joint action aimed to develop 
Russian-American partnership. 
I would say that emotions sometimes get the upper hand in assessing Russian-American 
partnership. This is not the approach that Bill and I have. Let's not forget that establishing the 
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Russian-American partnership relations is a very complex process. We want to overcome that 
which divided us for decades. We want to do away with the past mistrust and animosity. We 
cannot accomplish this immediately. We need to be decisive and patient, and we have both with 
Bill Clinton. 
I firmly believe that we will be able to resolve all issues which, for the time being, are 
still outstanding. Today's meeting with Bill convinced me of this once again. We will be doing 
this consistently, step by step. We will have enough patience and decisiveness. 
And now I ask you to put questions to us. 
I don't agree with you. It was today that we had progress, very principled progress, and 
they consist of the following— that, yes, indeed, we do maintain our positions. We believe that 
the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to 
minimize the negative consequences for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, a 
Russia-NATO agreement. And this is the principal question here. We've agreed on the 
parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton. 
This is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to those new members of NATO to not 
proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military 
infrastructure which remained in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too, will be included in the 
agreement with NATO. 









Today President Clinton and I exchanged wide-ranging views and opinions on the 
situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and agreed to further strengthen 
cooperation between our two countries to preserve the peace and stability of the region. 
President Clinton reaffirmed the United States firm commitment to the security of the 
Republic of Korea, and I supported the U.S. policy of foreign deployment, of U.S. troops to 
maintain peace in East Asia. President Clinton and I reconfirmed that maintaining and 
strengthening a firm, joint Korean-U.S. defense posture is essential to safeguarding the peace and 
stability not only of the Korean Peninsula but also of the Northeast Asian region. 
We share the view that improvement of relations between the United States and North 
Korea should proceed in harmony and parallel with the improvement of relations between the 
Republic of Korea and North Korea. We also agreed that our two countries will cooperate 
closely with each other in encouraging North Korea to open its doors in order to ease tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula and promote peace in Northeast Asia. 
With regard to this issue, I noted that the issue of establishing a permanent peace regime 
on the Korean Peninsula should be pursued through dialog between South and North Korea, 
under the principle that the issues should be resolved between the parties directly concerned. 
President Clinton expressed the U.S. total support and resolve to cooperate with the Republic of 
Korea regarding this issue. 
Korean Government supports the results of the Geneva agreement and Kuala Lumpur 
agreement. And President Clinton and I affirmed that the Governments of our two countries, 
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while maintaining close coordination with regard to the implementation of the U.S.-North 
Korean agreement, will continue to provide the support needed by the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization. 
President Clinton and I express satisfaction over the fact that the economic and trade 
relations between our two countries have entered a mature phase in terms of the size of our 
bilateral trade, the trade balance, and bilateral investments and should continue to develop 
further on a well-balanced basis. At the same time, we reaffirmed that our two nations will 
further expand mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation under the new international economic 
conditions being created by the inauguration of the World Trade Organization. We also agreed 
that any bilateral trade issues arising out of increasing volumes of trade between two countries 
will be resolved smoothly through working-level consultations. 
President Clinton and I concurred that our two countries need to further improve bilateral 
relations, both in terms of quality and quantity, so that in the forthcoming Asia-Pacific era of the 
21st century, our two nations can assume leading roles in enhancing cooperation and the 
development of the Asia-Pacific region. 
In this context, President Clinton and I agreed to coordinate closely with each other to 
ensure that the upcoming APEC summit conference in November of this year in Osaka will be a 
success. Furthermore, we agreed that our two countries will bolster multipronged collaboration 
in the United Nations and other international organizations. 
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